Use

Abstract

Abstract This chapter deals with the ways in which attention for language use influences Austin’s philosophy. It distinguishes an instrumental aspect from a systematic aspect of the use of language and argues that Austin paid attention to both, the former by replacing talk of the ‘functions of language’ with his speech act theory and the latter by analysing the role of various words and phrases in language as a system or within certain sentential or textual connections. It remarks that there is coherence between focusing on language use and refusing to reify meaning and that Austin’s philosophy of language is characterized by that refusal, in part under the influence of an analogous refusal by Wittgenstein (both philosophers connect the reification of meaning with philosophical overgeneralization in slightly different ways). It expounds Austin’s reinterpretation of the Aristotelian notion of paronymy, which he uses to account for the cases in which different things are called by the same name in a way similar to, but in part critical of, Wittgenstein’s family resemblances. Finally, it considers another way in which Austin manifests his opposition to the reification of meaning: his refusal to use the notion of proposition in his philosophy of language and speech act theory.