Affiliation:
1. University of Sheffield , UK
2. University of British Columbia , Canada
Abstract
Abstract
This chapter provides a brief conclusion to Part III, highlighting some of the important themes in Chapters 17–22. In considering the case for concept nativism, it is necessary to consider not only the arguments and considerations that support concept nativism, but also the most important and influential challenges and alternatives to concept nativism. Part III argues that none of these empiricist challenges or alternatives undermine our case for concept nativism. In fact, the many the problems that we identify for these challenges and alternatives only serve to strengthen our case for concept nativism. At the same time, we recognize that empiricist theorizing has led to important insights and models, which can make an important contribution to theories of conceptual development. But these insights and models can be incorporated into an overall rationalist approach to conceptual development, and this is how they stand to have the greatest impact.
Funder
University of British Columbia
Publisher
Oxford University PressOxford