Affiliation:
1. Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Abstract
Abstract
KK is the thesis that if you can know p, you can know that you can know p. Though it’s unpopular, a flurry of considerations has recently emerged in its favour. Here we add fuel to the fire: standard resources allow us to show that any failure of KK will lead to the knowability and assertability of abominable indicative conditionals of the form ‘If I don’t know it, p’. Such conditionals are manifestly not assertable—a fact that KK defenders can easily explain. I survey a variety of KK-denying responses and find them wanting. Those who object to the knowability of such conditionals must either (i) deny the possibility of harmony between knowledge and belief, or (ii) deny well-supported connections between conditional and unconditional attitudes. Meanwhile, those who grant knowability owe us an explanation of such conditionals’ unassertability—yet no successful explanations are on offer. Upshot: we have new evidence for KK.
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Cited by
19 articles.
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1. Inquiry beyond knowledge;Philosophy and Phenomenological Research;2023-12-08
2. Infelicitous Conditionals and KK;Mind;2023-11-10
3. KK, Knowledge, Knowability;Mind;2023-04-06
4. The Uncoordinated Teachers Puzzle;Episteme;2023-02-23
5. Assertion, Implicature, and Iterated Knowledge;Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy;2022-12-28