Abstract
Abstract
Hybrid metaethical theories have significant promise; they would have important upshots if they were true. But they also face severe problems. The problems are severe enough to make many philosophers doubt that they could be true. My ambition is to show that the problems are just instances of a highly general problem: a problem about what are sometimes called ‘intensional anaphora'. I'll also show that any adequate explanation of intensional anaphora immediately solves all the problems for the hybrid theorist. We should regard hybrid tools as among the most legitimate tools in our toolkit—at least when we use them properly.
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Cited by
2 articles.
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1. Noncognitivism without expressivism;Philosophy and Phenomenological Research;2023-01-14
2. A solution to the many attitudes problem;Philosophical Studies;2019-09-22