Affiliation:
1. Department of Political Science and Quantitative Theory and Methods , Emory University, Atlanta, GA , USA
Abstract
Abstract
Much of policy-making involves prioritization—deciding not only what to do but also when—and uncertainty—not knowing exactly how the choices made will affect actual policy outcomes. I present a theory of dynamic prioritization within a hierarchical organization. The model illustrates how notions such as an agency’s performance, mission, and critical tasks are linked with details such as institutional structure and the preferences of both front-line bureaucrats and their overseers. The theory highlights some reasons why even sincere, representative policy-making decisions might appear irrational, inconsistent, or “captured” to outside observers. This is in contrast to classical “spatial models” of policy that abstract from the more quotidian details of how policy is actually made as opposed to simply being “chosen.” The theory also generates traditional comparative static-style predictions about the features of the policy-making tasks, the preferences of bureaucrats and political overseers, and agency structure that affect the substance and quality of policy-making. Finally, the theory offers a general explanation for why real-world agencies employ widely varying processes to organize and implement policy-making: optimal policy-making is—in a precise sense—“sufficiently complicated” to render a succinct and robust summary of optimal management impossible.
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Subject
Marketing,Public Administration,Sociology and Political Science
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