State Capacity and Opportunistic Governance: The Causes and Consequences of Regulatory Brokerage in Thailand’s Guestwork Formalization Process

Abstract

Abstract How and why does brokerage become pivotal to guest work governance? While research on intermediaries in temporary migrant labor programs has proliferated in the last decade, there is limited analysis of the conditions that create regulatory roles for brokers and shape their policy and social impacts in host states. By analyzing the causes and consequences of documentation brokerage in Thailand’s guest work formalization process, I link sociological work on brokerage with relational conceptions of state power. Drawing from 17 months of ethnographic fieldwork in Thailand, I argue that gaps in the state’s regulatory infrastructure amid heightened coercive policy enforcement create profitable opportunities for brokers to act as intermediaries between migrants, employers, and state offices to facilitate policy implementation. The informality and opportunism of such brokerage, however, can also generate activities that undermine official policy, with varying consequences for state control. Comparing brokerage between two sites, I show that brokers in each location improve the state’s capacity to formalize migrant labor, but the added social/regulatory dimension of the border in the second site creates brokerage opportunities that push the boundaries of official policy. In both sites, documentation brokerage imposes adverse economic effects on migrants.