Strong-State Restraint as a Legitimation Strategy: Evidence from the South China Sea

Abstract

AbstractThis article argues that strong-state restraint is more likely to occur when lesser powers articulate their security preferences with a strong consensus. Why? Adherence to the consensus clarifies the dominant state's cooperative intentions, institutionalizes defensive military postures to mitigate security dilemma, and provides the concomitant benefit of recognition as a credible leader. If external validation matters in identity formation, then the acceptance of strong group consensus becomes an incentivizing legitimation strategy. This observation is evident in the interactions and authority relations between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the South China Sea. ASEAN members’ ability to develop security norms aimed at defusing tension shows that they are not as vulnerable as many believe. The finding draws on empirical evidence to show how small states induce change in a large power's behavior, and thus a positive theoretical advance with a testable argument about the causes for strong-state restraint.