Robust electoral violence prevention: An example from Ghana

Abstract

Abstract Existing electoral violence prevention programming does not sufficiently account for the incentives that compel political actors to use violence. When Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo defeated Ghana’s incumbent President, John Dramani Mahama, in December 2016, the transition was lauded for its orderliness and credited with furthering Ghana’s democratization. Many attributed the peaceful transfer of power to significant reforms undertaken by the electoral commission and the democratic values internalized by the candidates. However, we find that the reforms and personal attributes of the political actors were inadequate for resolving impasses that could have worsened the electoral environment. Our analysis reveals that interventions to prevent electoral violence must mitigate political actors’ incentives to use or tolerate violence in furtherance of their objectives. In Ghana, we find that back channel negotiations—coupled with identifying potential hotspots, early monitoring and observation, and conflict resolution mechanisms—created a robust electoral violence prevention framework that reduced tensions and produced a relatively peaceful political transition. Our findings advance existing theories and practices for preventing electoral violence, which emphasize capacity building, institutional reforms, and other technical approaches to managing elections. We conclude that directly engaging political actors is a critical component of preventing electoral violence in Africa.