Affiliation:
1. Australian Catholic University, Melbourne, Australia
Abstract
Abstract
This paper explores the principle that knowledge is fragile, in that whenever S knows that S doesn’t know that S knows that p, S thereby fails to know p. Fragility is motivated by the infelicity of dubious assertions, utterances which assert p while acknowledging higher-order ignorance whether p. Fragility is interestingly weaker than KK, the principle that if S knows p, then S knows that S knows p. Existing theories of knowledge which deny KK by accepting a Margin for Error principle can be conservatively extended with Fragility.
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
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