Affiliation:
1. W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University
2. Bocconi University and Belarusian Economic Research and Outreach Center (BEROC)
3. Carroll School of Management, Boston College
Abstract
Abstract
We study the relation between CEO and employee campaign contributions and find that CEO-supported political candidates receive 3 times more money from employees than candidates not supported by the CEO. This relation holds around CEO departures, including plausibly exogenous departures due to retirement or death. Equity returns are significantly higher when CEO-supported candidates win elections than when employee-supported candidates win, suggesting that CEOs’ campaign contributions are more aligned with the interests of shareholders than are employee contributions. Finally, employees whose donations are misaligned with their CEOs’ political preferences are more likely to leave their employer. (JEL G30, G38, D72, P48)
Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix and Data Supplement, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Subject
Economics and Econometrics,Finance,Accounting
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