Affiliation:
1. Department of Philosophy Central European University , Quellenstrasse 51 1100 Wien , Austria
Abstract
Abstract
On a Cartesian conception of the mind, I could be a solitary being and still have the same mental states as I currently have. This paper asks how the lives of other people fit into this conception. I investigate the second-person perspective—thinking of others as ‘you’ while engaging in reciprocal communicative interactions with them—and argue that it is neither epistemically nor metaphysically distinctive. I also argue that the Cartesian picture explains why other people are special: because they matter not just for the effect that they have on us.
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Reference17 articles.
1. ʻEpistemology Personalizedʼ;Benton;Philosophical Quarterly,2017
2. ʻTye on Acquaintance and the Problem of Consciousnessʼ;Crane;Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,2012
3. ‘The You Turn’;Eilan;Philosophical Explorations,2014