Affiliation:
1. Department of Philosophy University of York Heslington York yo 10 5 dd uk rob.trueman@york.ac.uk
Abstract
Abstract
According to the Dependency Theory, truth asymmetrically depends on the world, in the following sense: true propositions are true because the world makes them true. The Dependency Theory strikes many philosophers as incontrovertible, but in this paper I reject it. I begin by presenting a problem for the Dependency Theory. I then develop an alternative to the Dependency Theory which avoids that problem. This alternative is an immodest Identity Theory of Truth, and I end the paper by responding to Dodd’s charge that immodest Identity Theories are incoherent.
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Cited by
1 articles.
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1. Possible Worlds as Propositions;The Philosophical Quarterly;2023-11-27