Affiliation:
1. School of Philosophical, Anthropological and Film Studies University of St Andrews Edgecliffe The Scores St Andrews, ky16 9ar uk
Abstract
Abstract
In this paper I investigate what it is for a group to believe something for a reason. I defend a non-summative account on which a group can believe that p for a reason even though none of its members believe that p for that reason. By contrast, a summative account would hold that the reason for which a group believes that p is a function of the reason(s) for which its members believe that p. I argue that the proposed non-summative account deals better with cases in which members of a group believe that p for different reasons. I also defend it against a range of objections, including that it conflicts with epistemic norms for assertion and action.
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Cited by
14 articles.
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