Socio-economic framework for the design of national household insolvency systems

Abstract

Abstract Lessons learned in the aftermath of the Financial Crisis of 2008 include that long, punitive household insolvency regimes have a negative societal impact, increase the potential for financial instability and hamper national economic recovery. We propose the Socio-Economic Framework for Household Insolvency System Design as a regulatory mechanism that aims to control national household debt and productivity levels. The system facilitates an informal resolution of the conflict between over-indebted households and their creditors. When this is not possible, the system grants immediate relief to no-income, no-assets and ‘honest’ households, that experienced over-indebtedness because of an external negative shock, such as a medical emergency. Finally, when the household does not qualify for immediate relief, the system allocates the costs of insolvency between the household and creditors, based on responsibility for the over-indebtedness. This reduces the moral hazard.