Abstract
AbstractThis paper describes different forms of ownership across countries and how these forms influence the way companies are governed. In most stock markets in the world, listed companies frequently have a controlling shareholder, usually a family. However, Japan, the UK, and to a lesser extent the US, are exceptions. In these three countries, ownership is frequently highly fragmented, where share stakes are held by different institutional owners, including asset managers, both active and passive, and by shareholder activists. The paper focuses in particular on the governance structure of different institutional shareholders, how they engage with target firms, and their effectiveness. The paper concludes with recommendations for regulators to enhance different forms of ownership.
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Subject
Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law,Economics and Econometrics
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