Exploitative abuses in digital markets: between competition law and data protection law

Abstract

Abstract Online platforms increasingly offer consumers services ‘for free’, in exchange for collecting consumers’ personal data. This business model is highly successful, leading some online platforms to gain substantial market power. This market power can cause consumer harm—not through higher prices, but in the form of privacy harm. This article considers what role competition law and data protection law can play in mitigating this harm to privacy. The article considers how we can conceptualize exploitative abuse of dominance cases in zero-price markets. The article calls into question if data protection laws should play a role in antitrust abuse assessments, against the background of the Bundeskartellamt antitrust investigation into Facebook’s data collection practices. The article argues that, even in digital markets that unequivocally link market power with data privacy concerns, competition law and data protection law have complementary but distinct roles to play.