From silence to vigilance: overcoming barriers in public reporting of bid-rigging and cartel violations

Abstract

Abstract There are several ways to collect information on violations of antitrust laws, including ex officio detection, reports from the general public, and the use of leniency systems. There have been many discussions on improvements in the use of leniency systems and refining the ex officio detection method by improving the use of data by methods of analysis. However, improvements in public reporting have not often been considered. In this study, we confirm that 68.8 per cent of the general public provides information on bid-rigging and 49.6 per cent of the general public provides information on cartels, and that the reason for not providing information is the unlikelihood of success, which means a sense of powerlessness against powerful companies, followed by a feeling of lack of responsibility. Therefore, addressing that perception is the key to increasing information from the general public.