Forgiveness and the Modern Constitution: Derrida’s Perjury & Pardon

Abstract

Abstract The recently published two volumes of Derrida’s Perjury & Pardon seminars are interesting from a legal perspective, among others, because of Derrida’s comments there on the preamble and certain sections of the South African Constitution. The present article enquires specifically into the implications of Derrida’s analysis in the Perjury & Pardon seminars for constitutional interpretation, more specifically, by seeking answers to the question what it means to confess or to seek forgiveness for past crimes, as well as to refer to God in a constitution. With reference to Derrida’s seminars, it is contended that such a confession or request for forgiveness should be read as not only relating to determined crimes, but also to the unforgiveable crime of being-there, for existence. It is further contended that the reference to God in a constitution is to be read as pointing to what Derrida refers to as ‘the impossible’, that is, to impossible grace, unconditional forgiveness. In conclusion, it is contended that the modern constitution per definition includes such a confession or request for forgiveness, as well as a trace of the impossible, the latter which provides an indication of the scope of state responsibility.