Manipulating Public Beliefs about Alliance Compliance: A Survey Experiment

Abstract

Abstract Conventional wisdom on alliances proposes that leaders comply with alliances because the public opposes violating alliance commitments. However, this assumes that the public can easily judge whether or not a particular policy violates an alliance treaty. This article challenges this assumption and develops a theory that elites have the opportunity to shape public understanding as to whether an action violates an alliance treaty. It shows that while alliance commitments continue to have an important impact on public opinion, signals from unified elites can significantly reduce public pressure to support an ally by arguing that the alliance treaty does not create a legal obligation to intervene. In a pair of experiments on large samples of American adults, we found that a unified signal from the president and the Senate opposition leader can significantly reduce support for sending troops to the embattled ally. Consistent with elite cueing theory, the president’s ability to move public opinion in this manner is eliminated if the Senate opposition leader disagrees with his argument.