The paternalist politics of punitive and enabling workfare: evidence from a new dataset on workfare reforms in 16 countries, 1980–2015

Author:

Horn Alexander1ORCID,Kevins Anthony2ORCID,van Kersbergen Kees3ORCID

Affiliation:

1. Emmy Noether Group Varieties of Egalitarianism, University of Konstanz , Germany

2. Politics and International Studies, Loughborough University , UK

3. Department of Political Science, Aarhus University , Denmark

Abstract

Abstract Does neoliberalism lie behind the increased use of social policy to control and incentivize labour market behaviour? We argue that this assumed connection is theoretically weak and empirically inaccurate, and we point to an alternative explanation centred on government paternalism. Using a new comparative dataset on workfare reforms, we first describe how the overall balance of punitive and enabling demands placed on the unemployed has changed across 16 countries between 1980 and 2015. We observe a growing number of workfare reforms, modestly tilted towards the punitive side—but without a broad shift towards punitive workfare. We then assess the drivers of policy intervention, finding that government paternalism, rather than neoliberalism, helps us to understand which governments enact enabling and punitive measures. In line with our broader argument, we suggest that this reflects the moral (rather than economic) foundations of social policy.

Funder

University of Konstanz

Publisher

Oxford University Press (OUP)

Subject

General Economics, Econometrics and Finance,Sociology and Political Science

Reference87 articles.

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