Abstract
Abstract
In recent years, the notion of a ‘right to hope’ has emerged in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. This article offers an account of how this right has been constructed and of how hope is conceptualised in European human rights law. It examines the origins of the ‘right to hope’, the meaning of hope in this context and the relationship that is depicted between hope and dignity. It argues that hope is conceived of here as relational and that one way of thinking about the right to hope in this sense is as a right to recognition. This has two dimensions: one involving the recognition of the individual by others and another involving the recognition of the individual in and through law. The latter implies a certain relationship of dependency between the individual and European human rights law, with hope itself coming to be constructed as an individual responsibility.
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Subject
Law,Sociology and Political Science
Cited by
1 articles.
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