Affiliation:
1. Independent
2. School of Law, University of Texas, Austin, TX, USA
Abstract
Abstract
In the wake of a state-sponsored doping scandal, the World Anti-Doping Agency recommended banning all Russian athletes from the Rio Olympic Games. We study the circumstances in which such group penalties deter a group leader, whose payoff is tied to the group’s benefits and sanctions, from helping cheating group members avoid detection. We show that relative to individual punishment, group punishment deters orchestrated cheating and thereby increases individual deterrence for sufficiently strong enforcement and an intermediate detection-avoidance technology. Otherwise, group punishment fosters more individual cheating. Group punishment is thus a double-edged sword useful primarily as an off-equilibrium threat against orchestrated cheating but detrimental if frequently imposed on the equilibrium path. (JEL C72, K42)
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Subject
Law,Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management,Economics and Econometrics
Reference31 articles.
1. “Report: Microwave Weapons May Be behind Mysterious Illness Afflicting US Officials Abroad,”;Aleem;Vox,2020
2. “The Economics of Doping;Berentsen;European Journal of Political Economy,2002
3. The Doping Dilemma: Some Game Theoretical and Philosophical Considerations;Breivik;The German Journal of Sports Science,1987