Abstract
Abstract
Though the legal framework of urban planning plays a significant role in determining the nature of urban development, there is limited scholarship on the planning law regimes of different jurisdictions, especially in Asia and the global South. For countries like India, where the rule of law is seen to be weak and implemented arbitrarily, much of academic scholarship has focused on informality in urban planning, and the formal planning process has been relatively ignored. This article attempts to elucidate the planning law regime that operates in India through a close examination of the legal and institutional framework of urban planning in the city of Bangalore. It traces the colonial roots of India’s urban planning system, examines the institutions and processes of planning that operate in Bangalore, highlights the debates around the contents of the master plan, and examines the difficulty of enforcing the plan. This article argues that the fundamental concern with India’s urban planning regime is the disjuncture between the authority to plan and local democratic accountability. Even after the passing of the 74th Constitutional Amendment in 1992, which sought to empower municipalities by vesting them with multiple powers including that of urban planning, the master plan for Bangalore is still not prepared by the elected municipal government but by an unelected parastatal agency controlled by the state government. The article also discusses the concerns regarding the top-down planning process which does not provide adequate avenues for public participation, the static land-use based master plans that do not integrate key sectors of urban development, and the government’s approach of addressing non-enforcement of plans by legalizing violations of planning norms.
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Cited by
1 articles.
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