Affiliation:
1. Nanyang Technological University
2. School of Economics, Fudan University and Shanghai Institute of International Finance and Economics
3. Boston University
4. Tilburg University
Abstract
Abstract
We estimate a structural model of bargaining between a branch of a large transnational gang and pushers using data from detailed records kept by the gang. The model allows for the gang’s relative bargaining power to differ for pushers with different characteristics, such as those with addictions or borrowing problems. Exploiting supply shocks in our data, we use the estimated model to study the effectiveness of various enforcement strategies. We find that targeting pushers is more effective at reducing quantities sold compared to targeting the gang’s upstream supply chain.
Funder
Nanyang Technological University
Singapore Ministry of Education
NTU
Tilburg University
CEPR VIOS
Boston University
Yale University
IIOC
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Subject
General Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Reference43 articles.
1. The Hunt for Asia’s El Chapo;Allard,2019
2. Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach;Becker;The Journal of Political Economy,1968
3. A Theory of Rational Addiction;Becker;Journal of Political Economy,1988
4. The Market for Illegal Goods: The Case of Drugs;Becker;Journal of Political Economy,2006
5. Some Experimental Evidence on Differences Between Student and Prisoner Reactions to Monetary Penalties and Risk;Block;The Journal of Legal Studies,1995
Cited by
1 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献，注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献，订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献