Author:
Grafstein Robert,Moser Ann
Abstract
This paper illustrates one strategy for testing a theory of economic influences on voting. We use a competitive equilibrium model of the economy to determine the impact of an individual's economic position on his or her economic interests and, ultimately, political interests. We then test whether this impact is observed in voting behavior, addressing the resulting specification and estimation problems in the context of U.S. presidential election data. Our empirical results suggest that, despite these formidable problems, we can usefully connect political-economic models and discrete-choice (probit) models of voting.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Subject
Political Science and International Relations,Sociology and Political Science
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