The Social Construction of the Regulatory Burden: Methodological and Substantive Considerations

Abstract

Abstract What drives the private sector’s attitude toward the public sector? We address the question by regressing survey data on the perceived burden of government regulation on objective data on the nature, cost, and administration of the regulation of entry in different political and economic contexts. The results suggest that businesspeople perceive democratic, regulatory, and left-of-center governments to be inefficient, net of objective conditions, and tax havens to be well-governed despite—or perhaps due to—their lack of transparency. Our findings contribute to both the sociology of knowledge and political sociology by demonstrating that indicators of public sector performance that are derived from surveys of businesspeople and used by donors and investors are not only biased against liberal democracies that try to regulate and/or tax the private sector but—insofar as they influence the flow of public and private resources—a threat to regulation and redistribution in the twenty-first century.