The consequence of financial incentives for not prescribing antibiotics: a Japan’s nationwide quasi-experiment

Abstract

Abstract Background For addressing antibiotic overuse, Japan designed a health care policy in which eligible medical facilities could claim a financial reward when antibiotics were not prescribed for early-stage respiratory and gastrointestinal infections. The policy was introduced in a pilot manner in paediatric clinics in April 2018. Methods We conducted a quasi-experimental, propensity score-matched, difference-in-differences (DID) design to determine whether the nationwide financial incentives for appropriate non-prescribing of antibiotics as antimicrobial stewardship [800 JPY (≈7.3 US D) per case] were associated with changes in prescription patterns, including antibiotics, and health care use in routine paediatric health care settings at a national level. Data consisted of 9 253 261 cases of infectious diseases in 553 138 patients treated at 10 180 eligible or ineligible facilities. Results A total of 2959 eligible facilities claimed 316 770 cases for financial incentives and earned 253 million JPY (≈2.29 million USD). Compared with ineligible facilities, the introduction of financial incentives in the eligible facilities was associated with an excess reduction in antibiotic prescriptions [DID estimate, -228.6 days of therapy (DOTs) per 1000 cases (95% CI, -272.4 to -184.9), which corresponded to a relative reduction of 17.8% (95% CI, 14.8 to 20.7)]. The introduction was also associated with excess reductions in drugs for respiratory symptoms [DID estimates, -256.9 DOTs per 1000 cases (95% CI, -379.3 to -134.5)] and antihistamines [DID estimate, -198.5 DOTs per 1000 cases (95% CI, -282.1 to -114.9)]. There was no excess in out-of-hour visits [DID estimate, -4.43 events per 1000 cases (95% CI, -12.8 to 3.97)] or hospitalizations [DID estimate, -0.08 events per 1000 cases (95% CI, -0.48 to 0.31)]. Conclusions Our findings suggest that financial incentives to medical facilities for not prescribing antibiotics were associated with reductions in prescriptions for antibiotics without adverse health care consequences. Japan’s new health policy provided us with policy options for immediately reducing inappropriate antibiotic prescriptions by relatively small financial incentives.