The Principle of Befittingness

Abstract

Abstract What is it for an action to be morally required or prohibited? This chapter answers that question by enlisting the Principle of Befittingness: an act is morally required if, only if, and because it is befitting; an act is morally prohibited if, only if, and because it is unbefitting. The chapter defends this principle by revealing its explanatory power—among other important explananda, the Principle of Befittingness helps to explain why actions instantiate deontic properties, why there are strong moral reasons, and why instantiations of those properties give these reasons. The Principle of Befittingness is also able to systematize other, more familiar candidate fundamental deontic principles (consequentialist, deontological, and so forth). The chapter proceeds to locate the befittingness properties and strong moral reasons in the essence of moral requirement and prohibition. For instance, what it is for an action to be morally required is for it to be befitting, and for there to be strong moral reasons to perform it. This claim plays a crucial role in the argument for nonnaturalism developed in Chapter 13.