Real Materialism

Abstract

Abstract Chapter 3 pauses the central task of the book (to establish identity metaphysics as explicated in Chapter 2), and considers materialism, the view that everything that concretely exists is physical. It endorses ‘real’ materialism, i.e. materialism that is fully realist about consciousness or qualia. It argues that there is a fatal tension in philosophers’ use of the word ‘physical’: while ‘x is physical’ entails ‘x is non-mental’ in everyday language, this understanding of ‘physical’ cannot be carried over into philosophy, where it simply begs the question against the real (and traditional) materialist view that consciousness—real consciousness!—is wholly physical. The chapter also considers the changing fortunes of the word ‘materialism’: although the principal original claim of materialism was that consciousness was wholly material or physical, it came to be used to mean a view that doubted or denied the existence of consciousness.