Abstract
Abstract
A commitment to moral equality is everywhere accepted as a foundation stone of liberal moral and political philosophy. Yet it is often very unclear what such commitment, in fact, commits us to. In this chapter, I argue three main points. First, I argue that it is unclear whether it is the same commitment at the heart of predominant versions of consequentialism and non-consequentialism. Second, I argue that the reference to equality is redundant in the most common formulations. Third, I argue that we ought to distinguish, more clearly than has been done so far, the role of the commitment in debates on animal ethics and in debates on social equality.
Publisher
Oxford University PressOxford
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