Abstract
Abstract
My aim in this essay is first to clarify what any position worth calling “virtue epistemology” ought to hold. I then want to explore some of the relations between such an approach to epistemology and two other doctrines. One is a minimalist or deflationist conception of truth. The other is a generally expressivist approach to values and virtues, and hence to rationality.
Publisher
Oxford University PressNew York, NY
Cited by
2 articles.
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1. Pritchard on Veritism and Trivial Truths;Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research;2024-04-03
2. Teach Our Children Well;Second International Research Handbook on Values Education and Student Wellbeing;2023