Bootstrapping, Reasons, and the Normativity of What Matters to Us

Abstract

Abstract The problem of bootstrapping affects views about the nature and grounding of reasons. One bootstraps into existence normative (or justifying) reasons just in case merely treating x as a reason to φ makes x a genuinely justifying reason to φ. In this chapter, I draw attention to how bootstrapping affects our ability to account for the existence and import of agent-relative reasons to pursue personal projects. There are cases of putatively good agent-relative reasons where bootstrapping is the only route for the reason to come into being. Yet there is no account of what distinguishes these reasons from those where the bootstrapping renders the reasons illicit. I aim to solve this problem by providing such an account. I argue that bootstrapping’s badness is not a function of the procedure by which agent-relative reasons are generated; rather, it is a function of how we shift their weight in deliberation.