Abstract
AbstractThis chapter examines to what extent the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and the International Criminal Court encouraged domestic prosecutions of serious crimes in Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Focusing on areas of synergy, antagonism, and indifference, it assesses how international civil servants influence domestic prosecutorial policy, and, in turn, how state-based actors shape international prosecutorial strategy and case selection. It argues that, despite the divergent elements of institutional design, international investigative practices are generally similar and that divisions of labour, if any, depend less on mandates and more on incumbent governments’ willingness to cooperate with international prosecutors. While evidence of international criminal tribunals positively influencing domestic prosecutorial policy is uncommon and there is a risk of states free-riding on international trials, primacy may provide stronger incentives than complementarity for international civil servants to challenge states over crimes committed by suspects affiliated with incumbent governments.
Publisher
Oxford University PressOxford
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