Abstract
AbstractIf some concepts cannot rationally be replaced by our own lights, does this mean that they are perfect fit for the world, or that we are trapped into having to think that these concepts have to be used, even if they are a bad match for reality? This chapter argues that even though it is possible to be trapped by one’s inescapable concepts, we are not now trapped by our concepts. The significance of one’s own inescapable concepts can be appreciated by taking the immanent stance and by keeping in mind that in inquiry we aim to answer questions that we ourselves asked. This stance is contrasted with the transcendent stance, and the difference is made vivid by considering Eklund’s recent discussion of thin normative concepts. The immanent stance is closely tied to a general approach towards making progress in metaphysics, which is labelled immanent metaphysics.
Publisher
Oxford University PressOxford
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