Abstract
AbstractThis chapter focuses on how it is possible to draw substantial metaphysical conclusions from simply investigating our own representations of reality. It shows how this can be done in general, but then raises an issue concerning the quality of such results tied to the quality of the representations from which they are drawn. However, one can show in special cases that these results are of the highest quality. And we can again do this simply from thinking about our representations alone. This is connected to showing that certain concepts are inescapable in the sense of it being irrational to replace them with an alternative. The significance of such inescapable concepts is discussed, as well as a series of candidates for being an inescapable concept, in particular that of a fact.
Publisher
Oxford University PressOxford
Reference179 articles.
1. Primitive thisness and primitive identity.;Journal of Philosophy,1979
2. Adams, R. (2007). Idealism vindicated. In van Inwagen, P. and Zimmerman, D., editors, Persons human and divine, pages 35–54. Clarendon Press.
3. Bach, E. (1986). Natural language metaphysics. In Marcus, R. B., Dorn, G., and Weingartner, P., editors, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, VII. North-Holland.