Naturalism, Externalism, and Naturalistic Externalism

Abstract

Abstract The majority of epistemologists who favor epistemic naturalism also favor externalism about knowledge. But why exactly is that? After providing an overview of the various main positions and commitments associated with ‘naturalistic epistemology’ (NE), this chapter takes up the question of the relation between naturalism, so understood, and externalism. As we’ll see, while NE does not mandate externalism, neither is the observed connection between them an accident: as general approaches, both NE and externalism are animated by a desire to have realistic and genuinely explanatory epistemological theories, something that more traditional ways of thinking about knowledge are regarded as failing to achieve. As we’ll also see, however, corresponding to the variety among naturalistic views, there are significant disagreements among those within the naturalistic-externalist camp—most conspicuously, about the appropriate target of philosophical theorizing and the methods that epistemologists should employ in investigating it.