Abstract
Abstract
In the sense that matters here, someone’s knowledge that p is or requires a particular kind of connection between their belief that p and the fact that p. Externalist approaches to understanding this connection are unified by the rejection of two central ideas: that knowledge is incompatible with reflective awareness of the possibility of error, and that knowledge is necessarily tied to the resources that are available from within the first-person perspective. Despite this common and distinguishing core, however, externalism is nonetheless a variegated family. This brief introduction surveys seven of its main expressions.
Publisher
Oxford University PressOxford
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