Abstract
Abstract
This chapter argues that an important virtue of externalism about justification is that it helps to explain the value of knowledge. It also develops and expands upon the line of argument that is taken to be the most promising argument for externalism, one that appeals to morally loaded cases. Externalism is needed to understand how it could both be true that we’re subject to certain widely accepted normative requirements and that we should be guided by our beliefs. Since internalist views imply that these normative requirements don’t apply to all rational agents or that rational agents shouldn’t be guided by their beliefs even when they believe precisely those things that they ought to believe, we have very good reason for rejecting their picture of what we ought to believe.
Publisher
Oxford University PressOxford
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