States as Something Else

Abstract

Abstract This chapter considers whether the credence framework could accommodate the tenet by dropping the assumption that states are metaphysically possible worlds, and explores some of the difficulties for this view. The chapter begins by restating the apparent problem in reconciling the tenet with an interpretation of the credence framework on which states are metaphysically possible worlds, and then proceeds to explore alternative ways of interpreting states. A natural first idea is that states might be fine-grained possible worlds, and an argument is given that these fine-grained possible worlds must be ersatz worlds (to use David Lewis’s terminology), and linguistic rather than pictorial representations. Various difficulties for the idea are discussed—including the role of context and problems interpreting an artificial ‘world-building’ language. The chapter then turns to the question of whether the worlds should be coherent and/or complete, and here there is engagement with the literature on impossible worlds, logical omniscience, and content. With these issues in mind, it is shown that standard arguments for probabilism (dutch-book and accuracy arguments) are not cogent, and the chapter ends with a discussion of whether an account on which propositions are structured entities can be reconciled with the views discussed in this chapter.