Philosophers of science in the last half century have emphasized that scientific theories are not sets of transparently interpretable, logically connected true descriptions; rather, they involve implicit appeal to only partially articulated theoretical, practical, and empirical assumptions, and depart from stating the truth in various ways. One influential trend treats scientific theorizing as largely a process of model construction, and analyzes models as fictions. While this chapter embraces the increased role accorded to imagination and interpretation in scientific practice by the models-as-fictions view, it argues that different scientific representations relate to the world in importantly different ways. It distinguishes among a range of distinct representational tropes, or “frames,” all of which function to provide a perspective: an overarching intuitive principle for noticing, explaining, and responding to some subject. Starting with Max Black’s metaphor of metaphor as a pattern of etched lines on smoked glass, the chapter explains what makes frames in general powerful cognitive tools. It then distinguishes metaphor from some of its close cousins, especially telling details, just-so fictions, and analogies, first in the context of ordinary cognition and then in application to science, focusing on the different sorts of gaps that frames or models can open up between scientific representations and reality.