This book examines the prospects for infallibilism about knowledge, according to which one can know that p only if one has evidence which guarantees or entails that p. In particular, it focuses on the possibility of a non-sceptical infallibilism which rejects any kind of shifty view of knowledge, whether contextualist, relativist, or subject-sensitive invariantist. The availability of a non-shifty non-sceptical infallibilism seems to depend on whether such a view can defend a generous enough conception of evidence to allow us to have the knowledge we ordinarily take ourselves to have. In particular, such an infallibilist needs to allow that our evidence extends well beyond how things seem to us in our experience and includes claims about the external world. Thus, the infallibilism which is the focus of this book is committed to a generous conception of evidence. More precisely, I argue that infallibilism is committed to the following claims about evidence and evidential support: if p is evidence, then p is true; and if one knows that p, then p is part of one’s evidence, and p is evidence for p. However, I argue that these claims about evidence and evidential support are problematic. Furthermore, I argue that fallibilism can overcome the most serious objections levelled at it, which concern closure, concessive knowledge attributions, practical reasoning, and the threshold problem. So, I conclude that epistemologists who aim to avoid both scepticism and a shifty view of knowledge should be fallibilists.