Social vindication

Abstract

Abstract Social vindications of epistemic norms have to do with the importance of applying epistemic norms to one another’s beliefs. For example, social use of epistemic norms can help identify and create good sources of testimony. Social vindications of epistemic norms are ultimately reliant on some more fundamental vindication, which must be one of those discussed in previous chapters. For that reason, it should be initially plausible that the socially vindicated norms look just like the nonstandard norms already discussed. However, using ideas from work on conventional rules such as laws, one might argue that these nonstandard epistemic norms don’t serve the right function at the social level due to the possibility of error or disagreement. Even if standard epistemic norms end up being socially vindicated (which turns on empirical questions beyond the scope of this book), it does not matter that certain individuals conform to or are guided by standard norms.