Abstract
AbstractThis chapter explores some of the ways in which Cavendish and Conway use their metaphysical views to ground other areas of philosophical inquiry. The chapter begins with Cavendish’s objections to various aspects of natural philosophy as conceived by Thomas Hobbes, René Descartes, Francis Bacon, Robert Boyle, and Robert Hooke. It shows how Cavendish’s objections are largely based on her own metaphysical commitments, in particular her views on the nature of matter, perception, and motion. It then argues that Cavendish presents an argument against the misogynistic nature of the institutions of natural philosophy. Conway’s theodicean project is then introduced, and her views on God’s justice, sin and restoration, the nature of goodness, and eternal salvation are discussed. The chapter argues that Conway’s account of how creatures turn back to goodness after sin depends not only on the communicative and multiplicative nature of goodness, but also on the attractive nature of goodness.
Publisher
Oxford University PressNew York
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