Abstract
AbstractThis chapter examines Cavendish’s and Conway’s views on causation and perception. It argues that Cavendish identifies two distinct types of causation: occasional causation and substance transfer. It argues that Cavendish holds that nature is the only prime or principal cause in her system, and that occasional causes are necessary, and as part of the entire cause, sufficient for perception. The chapter argues that Conway also identifies two types of causation, mechanical and vital, and argues that Conway holds that the mind-body problem is resolved by the fact that bodies are moved by resistance, which is possible because spirit comes in degrees of penetrability. Finally, the chapter explicates Conway’s views on cognition and knowledge in light of her account of causation.
Publisher
Oxford University PressNew York
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