Conclusion

Abstract

Abstract This chapter synthesizes Critique of Halakhic Reason’s textual, legal, and philosophical arguments to clarify its larger claim: whether religious norms or obligations—even divine commandments—are justified and how they are implemented depends on the reasons that can be offered for and against them by human agents. Reasons and practices of reason-giving are thus central to religious thought and life. In the process, the chapter draws out the implications for Jewish philosophy and law, theology, and the study and philosophy of religion, as well as legal, political, and moral philosophy. Critical reflection on religion must recognize it not as an autonomous domain based on uniquely religious reasons—which is merely an updated version of the unhelpful category “faith”—but as a nexus of reasons with connections to theology, philosophy, law, politics, and ethics. Tracing and evaluating reasons in religious traditions thus requires agile movement across multiple discourses.