Abstract
AbstractA modest constructivism that endorses the constructivist account of moral concepts, but gives up on the idea of deriving normative conceptions from them, retains most of the advantages of the more ambitious view that embraces both theses. It can address Prichard’s Dilemma and parry metaphysical and epistemological challenges. It cannot answer all intelligible skeptical questions. But this paper argues that it can answer all those that are ours in Christine Korsgaard’s important sense.
Publisher
Oxford University PressOxford
Reference33 articles.
1. Barry, Melissa. “Constructivism.” In Tristam McPherson and David Plunkett, eds., The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, 385–401. New York: Routledge, 2017.
2. Cohen, G.A. “Reason, Humanity and the Moral Law.” In Christine M. Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, 167–87. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
3. Ebels-Duggan, Kyla. “Learning from Love: Reasoning, Respect, and the Value of a Person.” In Sara Buss and Nandi Theunissen, eds., Reconsidering the Value of Humanity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming.
4. Can there Be a Global, Interesting, Coherent Constructivism About Practical Reason?;Philosophical Explorations,2009