Abstract
Abstract
This chapter analyzes the transition from autonomy to statehood and the tensions that emerged between Garang’s New Sudan and secessionists. It then moves on to examine how the SPLM forcibly consolidated its power in the 2010 elections to advance the referendum process. By discussing its intimidation tactics, I show how the SPLM resorted to militarism or used violence to garner popular support. Not only did it end up excluding civil society actors from the drafting process of the Transitional Constitution but it also demonstrated the extent to which its leaders lacked civic training. The troubled transition in this sense exposed the effects of the lack of civic preparedness and the unfettered corruption of the ruling elite which recklessly extracted rents from the sudden influx of oil revenue. The problem, I conclude, was further compounded by the failure of international actors and donors to monitor the situation.
Publisher
Oxford University PressNew York
Reference315 articles.
1. Splitting South Sudan in 28 States: Right Moved, Wrong Time?;African Arguments,2015