Consequentialism and Epistemic Utility Theory

Abstract

Abstract Epistemic utility theorists, accuracy-first epistemologists, and truth-loving epistemic consequentialists all agree that, in a sense, epistemic norms are about maximizing accuracy in our doxastic states. This chapter focuses on two objections to the former views and asks whether they translate to truth-loving epistemic consequentialism. It starts by considering an objection from Gibbard (2008), which says that aiming at the truth is insufficient to explain the requirements of epistemic rationality. It then considers objections from Caie (2013), Greaves (2013) and Carr (2017), which say that despite what the theorists claim, epistemic utility theorists can’t use the standard tools of decision theory to justify their conclusions. The chapter argues that the objections don’t apply to truth-loving epistemic consequentialism. The upshot is that, even though the views agree that epistemic norms are about accuracy, there are important differences about the targets of the views and how accuracy is understood.