Abstract
AbstractIs there such a thing as experiencing a memory as one’s own? I argue that the phenomenon of disowned memory gives us a reason to believe that memories carry a sense of mineness. I challenge the view that the sense of mineness for a memory is the feeling of being identical with the witness of the remembered scene, and I put forward an alternative proposal. According to it, the sense of mineness for a memory is the experience of the memory as matching the past. I argue that the alternative proposal makes better sense of the available reports of disowned memory. I conclude by offering some considerations on how the proposed account could accommodate other cases of disowned conscious states.
Publisher
Oxford University PressOxford
Reference19 articles.
1. The phenomenology of agency;Philosophy Compass,2008
2. Bayne, T. and Montague, M. (2011) ‘Cognitive phenomenology: An introduction’, in T. Bayne and M. Montague (eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1–35.
3. Billon, A. and Kriegel, U. (2015) ‘Jaspers’ Dilemma: The psychopathological challenge to subjectivity theories of consciousness’, in R. Gennaro (ed.), Disturbed Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 29–54.
4. Thought insertion and self-knowledge;Mind & Language,2010
Cited by
1 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献,注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献,订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献
1. Against an Epistemic Argument for Mineness;Review of Philosophy and Psychology;2024-01-10