The Blind Desires ofRepublicIV

Abstract

AbstractIt seems clear that, according to Plato, all human motivation is fundamentally guided by, fixed upon, oriented toward, or connected to the good. But what exactly is the nature of this connection, as he sees it? One initially attractive reading holds that he sees it as a restriction on the contents of our desires: just as we must always perceive things under various guises—we don’t just see the sky, we see the sky as blue; we don’t just taste the wine, we taste the wine as sweet—so we must always desire things under the guise of the good. This chapter aims to show, first, that this reading is inconsistent with any reasonable interpretation of the argument of Republic IV; and second, that there is a promising alternative reading available to us—one that is not only consistent with the argument of Republic IV, but also philosophically and exegetically appealing in its own right. On this alternative reading, the connection Plato sees between desire and the good is, at bottom, a normative one, similar in character to the one we see between belief and the true: just as it is in the nature of our beliefs to be made correct (or successful) by the truth of what we believe, so it is in the nature of our desires to be made correct (or successful) by the goodness of what we desire.